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Reviews
Discretion to Disobey: A Study of Lawful Departuresfrom Legal
Rules. By Mortimer R. Kadish and Sanford H. Kadish. Stanford
University Press, 1973, Pp. x + 241.
The authors' purpose in this important and intriguing book is to
contribute to what they call "the jurisprudence of departures from
rules" [p. 5]. They try to establish that non-compliance with rules
of law may sometimes be justified not only on moral grounds but
also on legal grounds - that is, that the legal system itself has
considerable built-in tolerance of non-compliance with its own
rules, and that an official or an ordinary citizen who contravenes a
legal rule may well be able to make out a claim that he is acting
"legally" after all.
It is central to the authors' thesis that they do not see the legal
system merely as a system of standards, whether the standards be
called rules, or rules and principles, or even rules, principles and
policies. In addition to standards, the legal system sets up a large
number of roles of two general kinds: official roles and citizen roles.
A role, whether part of the legal system or not, has a "context of
evaluation" consisting of certain means and certain ends.
Sometimes legal roles expressly include discretion as one of the
means available to the person who fills the role (the "role agent").
For example, a judge may have statutory discretion to decide the
severity of a sentence or to waive a certain rule in certain situations.
But even if the means expressly or implicitly available to the legal
role agent do not include any such discretion, the ends of his role
may, in the authors' view, justify his non-compliance with legal
rules. Some role ends are of too low an order to provide such
justification - those ends, that is, which refer only to the role's
specific task ("task ends") or to its function within the larger
institution of which it is a part ("institutional ends"). However,
other role ends, called "background ends" by the authors, are more
fundamental and may be based in "commitments to norms that
transcend any institutionalized role" [p. 23]. Some of these
background ends may be recognized by society. Others may be
ignored by society for the time being, and yet others may be "ends
that perhaps no system of rules has ever achieved or could be
expected to achieve in full measure: ends such as a finer justice,
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kindliness, respect for other people, or human creativity" [p. 23].
Not all roles are elastic enough to include background ends in their
contexts of evaluation, but the role of legal official and the role of
citizen as recognized by the legal system do in the authors' view
envisage the resort to background ends by the role agents in order to
justify departures from the specific legal rules which set out the
lower-level ends of those roles and which set out the means by
which those lower-level ends are to be met.
The distinction between the two sorts of reasons which the
authors call "role reasons" and "excluded reasons" is an important
one. Role reasons are, in effect, reasons for action that are
appropriate to the role, given its particular context of evaluation.
Excluded reasons are those that the role agent "may recognize as an
individual but that in his role he cannot take into account" [p. 27]
- that is, reasons which make an action meritorious or
unmeritorious if considered out of context, but which are irrelevant
to its appropriateness to the agent's particular role. A role agent will
ordinarily act only on role reasons, but if there are excluded reasons
which conflict with role reasons in a particular case, he need not
necessarily disregard the excluded reasons. Rather, "he acknowledges his obligation to his role by imposing an extra burden, or
surcharge, so to speak, on the excluded reasons, so that they must
have significantly greater weight, in order to sway him" [pp.
27-28]. Depending on his attitude toward his role, any particular
role agent will tend to levy either a "finite" surcharge or an
"infinite" surcharge on excluded reasons. Levying an infinite
surcharge means that he will never act on reasons other than role
reasons, however strong those other reasons may be. Levying only a
finite surcharge means that he will act on excluded reasons if they
are compelling enough. Whether any particular set of excluded
reasons is strong enough to overcome any particular surcharge is, in
the authors' words, a question of "social philosophy" [p. 28].
Departures from rules, i.e., acting on excluded reasons rather than
on role reasons alone, may sometimes be not merely permissible but
actually necessary if the role agent is to play his role well. As
examples, the authors suggest that a good soldier will sometimes
disobey an officer's order to shoot civilians, and a good physician
will sometimes give pain-killers to a patient at the cost of decreasing
the likelihood that the patient will survive. Such departures, in the
authors' view, cannot be justified merely by saying that the role's
requirements are indeterminate. The requirements are indeed
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determinate, but the role itself includes "a liberty, often of a sort
that the role agent takes advantage of at his peril, to undertake
actions outside the role's prescribed means to achieve the role's
ends" [p. 31 ]. Roles that include such a liberty are called "recourse
roles" by the authors, apparently because the role agent is entitled
to have recourse to role ends where they conflict with prescribed
means. Not all roles are recourse roles, the authors admit, for many
of them are too narrow to permit the agent ever to depart from
authorized means in order to achieve certain ends (for example, a
clerk's role), or are so structured as to give the role agent explicit
authority to depart from stated rules in order to achieve certain ends.
However, the roles of official and citizen, even when they are not so
structured, "may sometimes function as recourse roles by virtue of
the way they are embedded in the legal system" [pp. 35-36].
In going on to deal more specifically with how the legal system
envisages rule departures by officials ("legitimated interposition"),
the authors construct a variant of what they call, after Weber, the
"rational-bureaucratic model of a legal system." They name this
variant the "rule-of-law model" - the model which "requires
those who exercise government authority to conform strictly to the
rules." Dicey's writings are taken as an early and extreme
expression of that model, Dicey being of the view that the "rule of
law" excluded not only what the authors call "deviational
discretion" [p. 42] (i.e., any right on the part of government
officials to disregard the law), but that it also excluded or virtually
excluded what they term "delegated discretion" (i.e., the explicit
conferring of discretionary power, by statute or statutory instrument, upon government officials). In the eighty years or so since
Dicey wrote, delegated discretion has been widely accepted, and
has been the basis of an immense growth in administrative
decision-making. Yet it is not this sort of discretion, but rather
deviational discretion, which interests the authors. As their prime
example of deviational discretion, they deal at some length with the
development of the jury's function "not only to guard against
official departures from the rules of law, but on proper occasions
themselves to depart from unjust rules or their unjust application"
[pp. 53-54]. If a criminal jury, after hearing the judge's instructions
on the law, chooses in the course of its deliberations to disregard
those instructions and to base an acquittal on their feeling that the
law ought not to be applied, there is no way the acquittal can be
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reversed. The following passage illuminates the authors' use of the
jury example.
Because the jury's role is a recourse role extending a liberty to
depart from the judge's instructions, does it follow that every jury
verdict contrary to those instructions is necessarily legitimated?
Certainly in at least one case it does not follow. This is the case
where the decision to depart is grounded on considerations that
do not even purport to be part of the accepted ends of the role. A
bribed juror, or one who responds to a familial relationship with
the defendant or to personal fear, cannot be regarded as acting
legitimately in his role. Such a juror abuses his authority in order
to serve a personal interest. Yet what should we say of a jury that
seeks to serve the ends of its role but grossly misinterprets them?
For example, consider a Southern jury that acquits a white
segregationist of killing a civil rights worker, on the grounds that
in the public interest carpetbag troublemakers must be discouraged from venturing into their community, and that in any event
the defendant's act was a political act that should not be punished
as a common crime. Is this an instance of legitimated rule
departure? The answer, we think, has to be yes. One is entitled to
say that this jury is egregiously wrong in its interpretation of the
ends of its role, both institutional and background; that its
ventured justification rests on premises that contravene the basic
ethos of the Constitution and the legal system founded on it; even
that it has violated the law insofar as one may regard policies and
ends of this kind as part of the law, as we do. But if our argument
is correct, one cannot say that this jury has acted lawlessly, in the
sense of usurping an authority it did not have, any more than one
could say of a judge that he acted lawlessly when in good
conscience he grossly misread the law. The liberty to make a
judgment on role ends is precisely what is entailed in recourse
roles; so long as the agent's judgment is conscientiously made on
his view of those ends, his rule departure is legitimated. Of
course, there is always the grave danger in recourse roles that the
agent will act in crass and damaging ignorance, with no
possibility of check or control. Any liberty may be misused. But
if our interpretation is right, the law has chosen to take that
chance in the case of the jury. [pp. 68-69].
It would not do, the authors assert - or at least, at an earlier date
it would not have done - for the law explicitly to recognize that
juries have the liberty to disregard the j.dge's instructions on the
law whenever they feel that the application of the law would lead to
an unjust conviction. The reason: "the very technique of explicitly
instructing the jury, without qualification, that they are obliged to
apply the law given by the judge helps ensure that they will impose
the required extra surcharge on any decision to depart from the
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rule." [pp. 64-65]. In other words, to create a legal rule giving the
jury an explicit right to do what it now has only a "liberty" to do,
would increase the danger that inadequately principled jury
decision-making would undermine existing legal rules, thereby
jeopardizing the symbolic steadfastness of the criminal law.
Of the authors' other examples of legitimated interposition, only
that of the judge need be raised. Both Jeremy Bentham and Jerome
Frank, the authors assert, based their criticism of free-wheeling
judges on a misapprehension of what is appropriate to the judicial
role. The authors quote Bentham's criticism of judges for using
legal fictions to bring about results that the judges thought just but
that were not in accord with the law - for example, the fiction that
a plaintiff child trespasser is "invited" onto the defendant's land if
some object that is alluring to children is put there. Also quoted is
Frank's opposite-extreme criticism of judges for not explicitly
accepting that they had the right to make new law whenever they
wanted, and for not then going ahead and making the best law that
they could make, free from the damaging illusion that they were
bound by precedent or statute or anything else. In preference to the
rule-positivism of Bentham and the rule-nominalism of Frank, the
authors propose the following account of the judge's role, while
acknowledging that they could not enter upon the "full-scale
treatment of the nature of judicial reasoning" [p. 881 that would be
required to support it. ".... .. the judge is indeed bound by the rules
of law, and he is bound to administer justice through those rules.
But sometimes the ends of justice may be disserved by following
those rules. In those cases the judge's role, unlike the clerk's,
extends him a liberty to make this judgment and to depart from the
rules to achieve results consistent with the ends for which his role is
set up. In sum, the judicial role is a recourse role." [p. 90].
With respect to rule departures by ordinary citizens ("legitimated
disobedience") the authors suggest that a second variant of the
"rational-bureaucratic model of a legal system" captures the
essence of the now prevalent view of the citizen's obligation to obey
the law. This variant they call the" law-and-order model."
However the laws are made and whatever they provide, the
law-and-order model requires the citizen always to comply: thus
a citizen in a democracy may be free to denounce a law and to
seek changes in it through the political process, but until the law
is changed it commands obedience of him. While the law stands
the citizen complies. The rule provides all that is necessary to
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guide action. There is no place for his own judgments, however
persuasive the grounds. To depart from the rule amounts in
principle to an act of rebellion, and though such an act might at
times be justified morally, it can never be justified by the legal
system being rebelled against. [p. 97].
More responsive in the authors' view to the realities of modem
legal systems - or at least to the realities of the American legal
system - is their concept that disobedience of a law by a citizen is
legally justified (not merely morally justified, but legally justified)
when four conditions are present.
First, the legal system must recognize what we shall call a
legitimating norm, the applicability of which falls within the final
authority of a legal official, usually but not necessarily a court of
law, to determine. Second, the norm must have the effect, when
found to apply, of relieving the citizen of the usual liability to
punishment for disobedience. Third, the norm must function not
as a qualification of the rule but as a justification for the citizen's
disobeying the rule. And fourth, the citizen must make a
colorable appeal to the norm as the justification for a departing
from the rule. [p. 99].
What do the authors mean by "legitimating norm"? They put
forward, and discuss in very interesting detail, three types of norm
which, they argue, meet each of the four conditions set out above.
The first of these types, the norm of -constitutional validity (or
invalidity, which perhaps makes its meaning clearer), is based in the
obvious point that a citizen is not obligated to obey an
unconstitutional law. If it is a statute that he disobeys, and he turns
out to be right in the sense that the statute is held unconstitutional by
the courts, then he will probably suffer no punishment at all. If it is
not a statute that he disobeys but a court order or an administrative
order, and that order is held to be unconstitutional, then it is much
more likely that he will still be given some punishment for "taking
the law into his own hands." Because it seems to be considered a
more direct affront to the symbolic authority of the law for a citizen
to disobey a specific, individualized order of a judicial or
administrative tribunal than to disobey the more olympian terms of a
statute, "the surcharge exacted on the citizen's reasons for
disobeying is increased" [p. 114]. It is therefore by no means clear,
as the authors recognize, that the norm of validity meets the second
of their four conditions for legitimated disobedience - the
condition that the norm, when held applicable by the court, should
serve to exempt the citizen from punishment. In addition, although
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the provisions of the constitution do not of course form a part of
every legal rule, it is surely a fundamental principle of any legal
system with a written constitution that every law will be read as
being subject to the terms of that constitution. It is therefore difficult
to see how it is, in the authors' words, "self-evident" [p. 123] that
the norm of constitutional validity meets their third condition - the
condition that the norm not serve as a qualification or exception to
the rule "but as a justification for the citizen's disobeying the rule."
It should be added that because the American constitution protects a
far wider range of rights from legislative interference than the
Canadian constitution, the norm of validity provides much more
scope in the United States than in Canada for questioning the
existence of what appear to be legal rules.
The authors' second legitimating norm is the norm of the lesser
evil, otherwise known as the defence of necessity in criminal law,
and perhaps most accurately called the norm of the "ultimate ends
of criminal law." It is the norm which permits a legal rule to be
disobeyed in order to avoid the doing of a greater evil, and
"essentially its standard is whether in the circumstances and on
balance it is better in terms of the ultimate ends of criminal law for a
person to violate a given rule than to obey it" [p. 120]. As the
authors point out, the "necessity"
to which judicial and
extra-judicial statements of this norm sometimes refer is "not
physical necessity. . . (that is another defence) but moral necessity,
which, of course, is not necessity at all but choice" [p. 120].
Among the examples which the authors quote from the commentary
in the American Model Penal Code are the following: "Property
may be destroyed to prevent the spread of fire. A speed limit may be
violated in pursuing a suspected criminal. An ambulance may pass a
traffic light. Mountain climbers lost in a storm may take refuge in a
house or may appropriate provisions." [p. 121]. This norm of the
lesser evil clearly meets the condition that it must relieve the citizen
of punishment for disobedience of the "greater evil" rule, and the
authors may be right in arguing that it also meets their third
condition that it not be merely an exception to the rule, for a
defendant who relies on it is "appealing to the judge to exercise the
authority vested in him by the law to create an ad hoe qualification
where none existed before on the basis of the ends of the criminal
law" [p. 124]. It is the appeal to the ends of a particular area of law
rather than to the terms of a written constitution which makes this
norm more interesting than the norm of constitutional validity,
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especially in a country where the existing written constitution is
incapable of being tortured into making the judiciary the same sort
of all-purpose overseer of legislative and executive action that it has
become in the United States. Yet the authors recognize, by their
definition of the lesser evil norm as relating only to criminal law,
that as things now stand this norm is not available to justify rule
departures on the basis of "moral necessity" in other areas of law.
In putting forth their third legitimating norm, the norm of
"justifiable nonenforcement," the authors start with the fact that
police and prosecutors have wide discretion not to enforce even
clearly valid legal rules, and go on to assert that such official
discretion not to enforce gives rise to "the possibility that
nonenforcement decisions may in some circumstances accord the
citizen a liberty to depart from the unenforced rule comparable to
that accorded him by the norms applied through the courts" [pp.
127-28]. Whether or not the prior nonenforcement on which the
citizen seeks to rely was based on a systematic policy of the
enforcing agency, it seems that such nonenforcement is becoming
recognized by the American courts as the basis for a constitutional
defence on the part of someone who is prosecuted under the
previously unenforced law. Therefore, in cases where the
invocation of the "justifiable nonenforcement" norm is based on a
pre-existing pattern of nonenforcement of the law in question, that
norm itself would appear to be based in the American constitutional
protection of equal treatment, and thus to be in substance
indistinguishable from the authors' first legitimating norm - that of
constitutional validity. The authors posit another situation where the
"justifiable nonenforcement" norm might be applicable, but I find
that situation virtually incomprehensible. I can only summarize it as
follows: "The authorities ought not to enforce this law. Therefore,
if I disobey it on the assumption that they will not enforce it, the
court ought not to convict me if they do seek to enforce it."
In their last two chapters, entitled "Legitimation as a Social
Strategy" and "Legitimation and the Idea of a Legal System," the
authors come to grips in a very interesting and instructive fashion
with the question whether existing social and legal systems - in
reality, the existing American social and legal system - could live
with rule departures of the types and on the scale that would seem to
be legitimated by the arguments they put forward in their earlier
chapters. In discussing the risks of legitimation, they express the
recognition that "no legal system other than one built solely on
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force can function without general acceptance among its citizens of
the obligation to comply with the rules" [p. 173], and that
extending the scope of legitimated rule departures might "threaten
both our freedom from the tyranny of office and our orderly and
consistent mode of conducting social affairs" [p. 177]. But, they
insist, it is safer for society to recognize a fair amount of leeway for
rule departures within the legal system, and then try to ensure that
rule departures occur only within that area of leeway, than to make
the boundaries of the legal system coextensive with the boundaries
of the positive law and then implicitly or explicitly accord some sort
of right or liberty to citizens or officials to step outside those
boundaries in exceptional cases. Essential to this conclusion is a
two-faceted view of the symbolic effect of the law. Facet 1: if a
standard or a liberty is called a legal standard or a legal liberty, the
bulk of the populace are more likely to obey it (in the case of a
standard) or less likely to abuse it (in the case of a liberty) than if it
is called an extra-legal standard or an extra-legal liberty. Facet 2: as
long as a legal rule is thought to be absolutely binding by the great
majority of unthinking or ill-educated citizens and officials, its
symbolic authority will not be destroyed if a few thoughtful people
violate it when they really think it right to do so. I will say more
about this "calculated hypocrisy" (to use the authors' term for it) in
a moment.
As an alternative to the "rule-of-law" and the "law-and-order"
models of legal obligation, both of which are part of the
"rational-bureaucratic"
or the "producer's" view of legal
obligation, the authors propose what they term a "checks and
balances" model of a legal system, borrowing the name commonly
given to the network of interwoven constraints that bind the three
branches of government under the American constitution. In the
context in which the authors use it as well as in its broader
constitutional context, the checks and balances model has the
attractive theoretical feature of preventing an undue concentration
of power. It is anti-majoritarian. The devices of legitimated
interposition and legitimated disobedience are designed to make it
even harder than it already is under the American constitution for an
electoral majority that might have control of both the legislative and
executive branches to claim that it also has the law on its side.
However, the anti-majoritarianism of the checks and balances
model of a legal system, as developed by the authors, has its
unattractive side as well. The authors' model is based on the
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existence of a significant gap between what the rules of law say and
what the legal system permits. This gap can be exploited by those
who know what sorts of considerations have to be invoked in order
to persuade legal authorities to permit departures from what the
rules seem to require, or by those who have access to those who
know. For individuals or groups who do not move in circles where
such knowledge is readily available, the legal system inevitably
appears much more rigid and perhaps much more repressive. I see
disturbing implications in the authors' apparent readiness to tolerate
this unequal incidence of the symbolic force of the law. They seem
to accept that the law often relies on what they term "calculated
hypocrisy" [p. 180] to secure obedience from those who, if they
knew better, would realize that they could, with impunity, withhold
obedience under certain circumstances and under the cover of
certain "legitimating" arguments. "Some tension between what is
said and what is done in the legal system as elsewhere may be
benign and useful. There is an element of theater in the law, but this
is not to say that it is all farce." [id. ]. A similar note is struck in a
passage from Ronald Dworkin, quoted by the authors [p. 135n],
giving reasons why draft law violators should not be prosecuted if
they have acted on the basis of conscience. "One is the obvious
reason that they act out of better motives than those who break the
law out of greed or a desire to subvert government. Another is the
practical reason that our society suffers a loss if it punishes a group
that includes -

as the group of draft dissenters does -

some of its

most thoughtful and loyal citizens."
It would be unfair to overstate the extent of the authors'
acceptance of "calculated hypocrisy" as a preservative of social
order. It is true that in considering whether police discretion in
criminal law enforcement ought to be characterized as a discretion
to deviate from the rules or as a discretion included in the rules
themselves, the authors do suggest that the former characterization
has the advantages of "allowing the official rule of full enforcement
to be maintained" [p. 77] and of avoiding "acknowledgment of the
extent to which important matters, even those directly affecting the
citizen's liberty, are left to the official's discretion - an
acknowledgment that would undoubtedly be an affront to the
rule-of-law tradition" [pp. 78-79]. However, they insist in the very
next sentence that "we are not arguing that it is better to permit the
police to operate outside the rules than to recognize their
discretionary authority and seek to control it within a rational
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structure, thereby ensuring equal treatment of citizens before the
law."
Still, the authors' acknowledgment of the importance of the
difficult ideal of equality before the law begs the essential issue of
gross inequality of access to the type of legal logic and rhetoric that
is necessary to develop a case for any of the various sorts of
legitimated departures that they talk about. Basically, the unwashed
are to be kept under the illusion (which for them may not be an
illusion at all) that the law will always be strictly enforced, while the
suitably informed can safely be allowed to realize the truth as long
as they do not flaunt their realization. As well as being even more
bankrupt in terms of social justice than the "rule-of-law" and
"law-and-order" models which the authors explicitly (and I think
rightly) reject, an approach based on "calculated hypocrisy"
simply could not work. The unwashed are not always so slow to
realize what is happening, and would certainly be no slower if
confronted with the more widespread elite disobedience that the
authors seem to think can be legitimated in terms of the law itself. If
the man near the bottom of the social totem pole sees the legal
system itself allowing higher-ups to escape punishment for breaking
draft laws or marijuana laws or abortion laws, why should he feel
inhibited from stealing or robbing to better his lot, or from beating
his wife when she deserves it? To tell him that there is structured
into his role as citizen a liberty to depart from legal rules if he can
invoke a legitimating norm, and that it just happens to be easier to
make a case for the applicability of such a legitimating norm with
respect to the laws that bother other people than with respect to the
laws that bother him, is not to tell him anything very helpful or very
convincing. On the other hand, if the focus is taken off the question
of what can or cannot be justified by a legitimating norm that might
somehow be nudged or squeezed into the legal system and is placed
instead on the question of whether or not a strong moral case can be
made for compliance with (or strict enforcement of) the legal rules
that are admitted to apply in the particular case, I think large steps
will have been taken toward making the whole matter more
comprehensible.
Implicit in the authors' approach is a rejection of legal positivism
for its refusal to give legal permission to the official or the ordinary
citizen to depart from even a plainly unjust law until the legislature
is moved to act (or, as is perhaps more often the case in the United
States, until the higher courts are moved to act). However, the
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appropriateness of positivist attitudes toward the law largely
.depends, I think, on the sort of role one has in the legal system first, the role of judge or practicing lawyer; second, the role of legal
researcher or law reformer; or third, the role of ordinary citizen.
First, with respect to judges and lawyers, rejection of the positivist
approach is amply justified. To the overworked or lazy lawyer or
judge, the positivist distinction between law and morals all too
readily serves as an excuse for dismissing as totally irrelevant to his
job any consideration of the moral and social implications of what
he is doing. The few great Canadian judges have seen their roles
very much as recourse roles and have been fully aware that the law
is open at innumerable points to be formed, influenced or changed
by moral reasoning. The authors' central notion that the judge's or
lawyer's role is not coterminous with any body of legal rules is a
useful vehicle for communicating the capacity of those role agents
to make constant improvements in the law and to design just
solutions in individual cases. To legal researchers and reformers,
however, the positivist model of law as a system of rules has great
value as a basic research tool enabling areas of law to be
decontextualized in order to facilitate, first, the analysis of their
structure and content, and second, the empirical study of their actual
or likely social effects. The recourse role notion is certainly not
without its usefulness to the researcher and reformer, but its value to
him is as a sort of secondary causal factor which might help to
explain differences between the intended or expected social effects
of legal rules and their actual effects. Finally, to the ordinary citizen
who lacks familiarity with legal reasoning and who seeks guidance
on the extent of his obligation to obey the law, the recourse role
notion seems, as I have suggested above, to offer less prospect of
enlightenment than the more straightforward notion of a legal duty
to obey coupled with a moral duty to evaluate and, in a strong
enough case, to disobey.
The obvious questions arising from what I have just said are,
first, what is a strong enough moral case for disobedience, and
second, on what basis may a judge appropriately withhold
punishment from an individual who has made out such a case? Any
hope that satisfactory answers could be developed to these questions
over time would, I think, depend on the explicit incorporation into
the law, perhaps at the constitutional level, of a broad moral
principle somewhat similar to the authors' second kind of
legitimating norm - the norm of the lesser evil. As for the criterion
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that such a principle might provide for the use of officials and
citizens in weighing the relative evils of compliance and
non-compliance, the principle of utility which has become so
embedded in British and Canadian legal philosophy over the past
century, and which has been subjected to close and continued
scrutiny by many moral philosophers, would still appear to be the
most promising candidate. That there might be insuperable
difficulties in getting agreement on such a principle, or in wording it
appropriately, or in deciding its application in concrete cases, is all
too apparent. Yet the result might be sufficiently more meaningful
to sufficiently more people than what the authors propose, and
sufficiently more in accord with the constitutional traditions of
common-law countries other than the United States, to make the
entire effort worthwhile.
The authors' undertaking, if I may attempt to restate my
perception of it, is to use the concept of role to bridge the
"is-ought" gap in the context of the legal system. Rules of law and
other legal standards remain on the "is" side, but the legal roles of
official and citizen are seen as broad enough to stretch over to the
"ought" side. As those roles are part of the legal system, the
boundaries of that system therefore also extend across the gap. To
judges and practicing lawyers, this concept of role speaks
eloquently and probably intelligibly. To the ordinary citizen - at
least to the ordinary non-American, and perhaps to the ordinary
American as well - who wonders about his obligation toward laws
that seem to him unjust, it does not speak plainly enough.
Bernard Adell
Faculty of Law
Queen's University*
*This review is based on a paper read to the Philosophy Department Colloquium,
Queen's University, Kingston, November 21, 1974.

